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An Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to
Determine Arbitrability of Labor
Disputes Under Public Sector
Collective Bargaining Agreements:
Is the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to
Decide Arbitrability in the First
Instance the Worst of Both Worlds?
McLaughlin v. Chester Upland School District'

I. INTRODUCTION
Although as a general rule the arbitrability of disputes under a collective
bargaining agreement has been for a court to decide,2 arbitrators are not entirely
without jurisdiction to decide the question initially.' Difficult jurisdictional
questions arise, however, when one party seeks to compel or stay arbitration.
When a party seeks to stay or oppose compulsion of arbitration on the basis that
the dispute is not arbitrable under a collective bargaining agreement, may a court
decide arbitrability in the first instance? The rule followed by federal courts
construing section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and most state
courts in construing similar state labor statutes is that courts have initial
jurisdiction to decide the issue of arbitrability.4
The general rule permitting pre-arbitration adjudication of arbitrability has
been criticized as an invitation to forum-shopping and a "race to the courthouse,"5

1. 655 A.2d 621 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1995). Since this decision was the second major decision by
the commonwealth court in a case involving the Chester Upland School District in a period of two
years, subsequent short cites to this case will be to Chester Uplandff.
2. Annotation, Matters Arbitrable underArbitrationProvisions of a Collective Labor Contract,
24 A.LR. 2d 752 (1952); Ann C. Hodges, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years after the
Steelworkers Trlogy: the Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 631, 641
n.69 (1990).
3. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 25 (1975); Hodges, supra note 2, at 641 n.68.
4. Hodges, supra note 2, at 641 n.68.
5. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist, 451 A.2d 671, 674 (Pa. 1982);
see Mark P. Widoff & Michelle Fastiggi, The Judiciary'sRole in Compelling or Staying Public
Employment Grievance Arbitration UnderPennsylvania'sEnactment of the Uniform ArbitrationAct:
Reconciling PERA and the U.A.A., 98 DICK. L REV. 630, 654 (1994).
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an unnecessary obstacle to expeditious resolution of labor disputes,6 and a bad
faith attempt by one party (usually the employer) to breach a contractual
commitment to arbitration.7 Overruling a number of its own precedents following
this majority rule, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently held in
McLaughlin v. Chester Upland School Districtthat an arbitrator has the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to decide the arbitrability of a labor
dispute arising out of a public sector collective bargaining agreement.8

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Mildred McLaughlin ("McLaughlin") was a special education teacher
employed by the Chester Upland School District ("District"). 9 On April 2, 1992,
McLaughlin received a letter from the district superintendent telling her that she
was suspended without pay after hearings regarding her alleged infliction of
corporal punishment on special education students.' ° In response, the ChesterUpland Education Association ("Association") filed a grievance on behalf of
McLaughlin." The grievance sought restoration of McLaughlin's status as a
tenured professional employee without loss of compensation or benefits. 2 On
May 15, 1992, the Association, citing the collective bargaining agreement
("Agreement") betweenthe Association and the District, sent a letter to the district
superintendent requesting the selection
of a mutually acceptable arbitrator.' 3 The
4
letter.'
this
answer
to
failed
District
Since the parties failed to select an arbitrator, the Association requested a list
of arbitrators from the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry's Bureau
of Mediation ("Bureau") on June 4, 1992." Still no response came from the
District after the Association received the Bureau's list of arbitrators. 6 Alleging
that the District's continued refusal to cooperate in selecting an arbitrator was an
unfair labor practice under section 903 of Pennsylvania's Public Employee

6. Charles B. Craver, Symposium onLaborArbitrationThirty Years afler the SteelworkersTrilogy:
LaborArbitrationas a Continuationof the Collective BargainingProcess, 66 CfH-KEI- L. REV. 571,
584 (1990).
7. Id. at 584.
8. Chester Upland II, 655 A.2d at 629. On September 15, 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court granted an appeal from the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Chester Upland
II. McLaughlin v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 665 A.2d 471 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1995). As of the date
of this note, no opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on this appeal was available.
9. Id. at 623.
10. Id. The District also cited McLaughlin for such other alleged misdeeds as "her unauthorized
dismissal of her class on or about May 6, 1988, endangering the students thereof." rd. at 623 n.2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Relations Act ("PERA"), 17 the Association filed an unfair18 labor practices charge
with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board ("PLRB").
The District filed a stay of arbitration in the trial court in which the District

argued that the dispute was not arbitrable under the Agreement since McLaughlin
had a remedy under Pennsylvania's Public School Code of 1949.'9 After the
matter was scheduled for a hearing before the trial court,2 ° no additional action
was taken by the trial court.'
Finding the District's refusal to arbitrate an unfair labor practice in itself, the
PLRB found that under section 903 of PERA, an arbitrator initially decides if a
grievance is arbitrable.22 Returning to the trial court, the District sought (1)
review of the PLRB's finding that it committed an unfair labor practice by not
agreeing to arbitration and (2) an injunction.23 The District requested the trial
court to determine that the demotion of McLaughlin was not arbitrable pursuant
to the agreement because McLaughlin allegedly had a remedy under the Public
School Code.24
On July 16, 1993, the trial court issued an order granting the District's
petitions for review and injunctive relief and reversing the PLRB's finding that the
District's failure to arbitrate was itself an unfair labor practice.2" In a second

17. The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:
Arbitration or disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. The procedure to be adopted is a
proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step shall provide for a binding
decision by an arbitrator or a tri-partite board of arbitrators as the parties may agree. Any
decisions of the arbitrator or arbitrators requiring legislation will only be effective if such
legislation is enacted: "(1) If the parties cannot voluntarily agree upon the selection of
an arbitrator, the parties shall notify the Bureau of Mediation of their inability to do so.
The Bureau of Mediation shall then submit to the parties the names of seven arbitrators.
Each party shall alternately strike a name until one name remains. The public employer
shall strike the first name. The person remaining shall be the arbitrator."
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.903 (1991).
18. Chester Upland I, 655 A.2d at 623.
19. Id. at 624. The stay was filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Delaware County. The
District claimed that the grievance provision under the Agreement should not be construed to apply
where the teacher had a statutory remedy under the Public School Code of 1949. Id.The relevant
section of the Public School Code provides in relevant part that:
there shall be no demotion of any professional employee either in salary or in type of
position, except as otherwise provided in this act, without the consent of the employee,
or, if such consent is not received, then such demotion shall be subject to the right of a
hearing before the board of school directors and an appeal in the same manner as
hereinbefore provided in the case of the dismissal of a professional employee.
24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-1151 (1992).
20. The original trial court judge recused himself for reasons not specified in the court's opinion.
Chester Upland II,
655 A.2d at 624.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.at 624 n.7.
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opinion, the trial court agreed with the PLRB that arbitrability was initially to be
determined by an arbitrator.26 Following a hearing, the trial court issued new
orders (1) granting the District a Stay of Arbitration and (2) vacating its July 16,
1993 order.27 The second order also granted the District's petition for review by
reversing the decision of the PLRB except insofar as it found the District's failure
to arbitrate or to seek a timely stay of arbitration an unfair labor practice.2' The
Association and the PLRB each filed appeals in the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania29 and the District filed cross-appeals of both orders.3 ° The
Association and the PLRB alleged error, citing section 501(a) of the Uniform
Arbitration Act ("UAA") for the proposition that the trial court had the jurisdiction
to determine arbitrability only to the extent the UAA is consistent with state labor
statutes, in this case section 903 of the PERA. 3"
The Conmnonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court's first
order granting a stay of arbitration and reversed its second order except insofar as
it affirmed the PLRB's finding the refusal to arbitrate an unfair labor practice,
thereby reversing the trial court's own determination that the District's failure to
2
seek a timely stay of arbitration was an unfair trade practice.3 Explicitly
3
" stated
court
commonwealth
the
overruling its own precedents to the contrary,
with
it
was
consistent
that section 501(a) of the UAA would control to the extent
an
of
PERA
903
under
section
that
and
held
statutes
Pennsylvania's labor
questions
regarding
all
to
determine
jurisdiction
exclusive
has
sole
and
arbitrator
the arbitrability of issues.3 4
Judge Doyle dissented in part, disputing that an arbitrator possesses sole and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine arbitrability in the first instance.35 Judge
Doyle argued that a trial court should still have jurisdiction to determine
arbitrability until an unfair labor practice charge is filed with the PLRB, at which
point the PLRB should assume exclusive jurisdiction."

26. Id.
27. Id. at 624-25.
28. Id. at 625.
29. The commonwealth court is Pennsylvania's intermediate court of appeals for, among other
matters, appeals from decisions of administrative agencies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 762(aX3) (1981).
30. Chester Upland II, 655 A.2d at 625.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 629-30.
33. The opinion was written by Judge Pellegrini (Judges Collins, McGinley, Friedman, and
Newman concurred; Judge Smith concurred in the result only). Id. at 630.
34. Id. at 628.
35. Id. at 630.
36. Id. at 635.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

It is generally not disputed that trial courts have the jurisdiction to decide
whether a dispute is arbitrable." The controversy before the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court in Chester Uplandllarosefrom the question of when courts
have the jurisdiction to make such a determination.
To the extent there is a general rule with respect to an arbitrator's jurisdiction
to determine the arbitrability of a labor dispute, it is that the courts, and not an
arbitrator, have jurisdiction to determine arbitrability in the first instance. 8
Federal courts so decide cases brought under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 9 Many state courts follow a parallel rule, but some
state courts hold that the arbitrator makes the initial determination of arbitrability,
subject to review by a court of law.40
The most extreme deference to an arbitrator's finding of arbitrability occurs
where a statute expresses a legislative desire to supplant common law adjudication
with arbitration and the statute divests a court of jurisdiction to enjoin arbitration.
This view was represented by the Illinois Supreme Court in Board of Education
of Warren Township High School District 121 v. Warren Township High School

Federationof Teachers." Citing the drastic nature of the legislative scheme (in
the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act) and the potential for inconsistent
decisions resulting from forum shopping when common law courts retain
jurisdiction to enjoin arbitration, the Illinois Supreme Court held that trial courts
had no jurisdiction to enjoin arbitration. 42 Thus, the Illinois Educational Labor

37. As will be explained, Illinois is a notable exception to this rule in the area of public education
labor relations. See Board of Exc. of Warren Township High Sch. Dist 121 v. Warren Township

High Sch. Fed'n of Teachers, 538 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. 1989).
38. Hodges, supra note 2, at 641 n.68.
39. Section 301, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). Federal district courts thus have the power to decide if a question is
arbitrable and may enjoin arbitration where the matter is not arbitrable under the governing collective
bargaining agreement. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986).
40. Hodges, supra note 2, at 643. When looking at arbitrability in an appeal of an award, these
courts vacate awards only when it is clear that the dispute was non-arbitrable, since in such cases an
arbitrator has exceeded the proper authority by going outside the essence of the collective bargaining
agreement See, e.g., State v. AFSCME, Council 4, 537 A.2d 517, 518-19 (Conn. App. 1988) (quoting
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)); see also Taylor v.
Crane, 595 P.2d 129, 134 (Cal. 1979).
41. 538 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. 1989),
42. Warren, 538 N.E.2d at 529.
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Relations Board makes the initial determination of arbitrability subject to later
review by an appellate court.43
In 1982, Pennsylvania adopted the view giving arbitrators jurisdiction to
decide arbitrability of public sector labor disputes inPennsylvaniaLaborRelations
Board v. Bald Eagle Area School District." In that case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court construed section 903 of PERA45 to give the arbitrator
jurisdiction to make the initial determination as to whether a matter was arbitrable
under a collective bargaining agreement allegedly in conflict with state statute.46
"[W] ere we to decide otherwise," the Bald Eagle court reasoned, "we would only
encourage potential parties to such disputes to continue to follow the practice of
preliminary [sic] litigating through one forum the power of another to decide the
substantive issue."47
The Bald Eagle court did not, however, address whether trial courts retained
jurisdiction to compel or stay arbitration where the party seeking to compel or
enjoin arbitration cited the arbitrability of the subject matter in dispute.48 Section
501(a) of the UAA, adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1980, 9 gave the
courts jurisdiction to compel or stay arbitration, subject to the limitation that this
is "consistent with any
power only extended to disputes where the arbitration
50
statute regulating labor and management relations.
Without considering the effect of the UAA on trial court jurisdiction, the
commonwealth court in Mfflin County School District v. Lutz, 51 held that the
trial court had jurisdiction to stay arbitration where the collective bargaining
agreement expressly proscribed arbitration to settle a dispute over teacher ratings

43. Id.
44. 451 A.2d 671 (Pa. 1982).
45. The relevant portion of the statutory provision reads: "Arbitration of disputes or grievances
arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory."

43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103.903 (1990).
46. Bald Eagle, 451 A.2d at 672.
47. Id. at 674. Whether the court had decided that the arbitrator has sole and exclusive
jurisdiction to make the arbitrability determination is a question that divided the commonwealth court
in Chester Upland II. However, the language of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bald Eagle

strongly supports the idea of the arbitrator's sole and exclusive jurisdiction, at least where the issue of
arbitrability implicates statutory policies: "issues involving conflicts between a public sector collective
bargaining agreement and fundamental statutory policies of this Commonwealth must be presented first
to arbitration for determination, subject to appropriate court review of any award in conflict with such
policies." Id.
48. Arbitrability in Bald Eagle was presented to the courts on petition for review of the PLRB's
determination that the matter was arbitrable. No injunction of the ordered arbitration was sought Id.
at 671-'72.
49. Part of Pennsylvania statutory law as 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(b) (1990), which
provides in relevant part: "On application of a party to a court to stay an arbitration proceeding
threatened or commenced the court may stay an arbitration on a showing that there is no agreement
to arbitrate."
50. Id.
51. 551 A.2d 396 (Pa. Commw. CL 1988), appeal denied, 565 A.2d 446 (Pa. 1989).
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(at issue in the case). 2 The court reasoned that section 7304(b) of the UAA as
adopted by Pennsylvania only called for arbitration where there was an agreement
to arbitrate, and thus where an agreement was clear on its face in prohibiting
arbitration, arbitration could not be considered mandatory.53 The following year,
the commonwealth court did confront the impact of the UAA on trial court
jurisdiction to determine arbitrability in Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School EducationAss'n v. Executive Council of the Middle BucksArea Vocational
Technical School.54 Comparing the supposed silence of PERA as to the
arbitrator's jurisdiction to determine arbitrability with the UAA's express sanction
for trial court jurisdiction to compel or stay proceedings, the court favored the
specific statutory of language of the UAA over the general statutory language of
PERA and thus held that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine arbitrability
on petition of the parties."
The commonwealth court arguablybegan to retreat from its earlier solicitude
of trial court jurisdiction under the UAA in its 1993 ruling in Phoenixville Area
School District v. PhoenixvilleArea Education Association.56 There, the court
held that trial court jurisdiction to determine arbitrability in the first instance was
only proper where the collective bargaining agreement was clear in specifying
when arbitration was appropriate."1 The court based its holding on the grounds
that PERA section 903 only mandated arbitration of disputes arising from the
interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.5 The
reasoning of the court implied that where the language of the provision is clear on
the face of the collective bargaining agreement, there is nothing to interpret and
thus a stay is "not appropriate, and an arbitrator must determine whether the
dispute is grievable." 59 The court counseled trial courts against enjoining
arbitration except where it could conclude "with positive assurance" that the
parties agreed that the dispute was not to be arbitrated.6°
In Chester Upland School Districtv. PennsylvaniaLabor RelationsBoard,61
the commonwealth court elaborated on its holding in Phoenixville Area School
District,describing the threshold showing by the party seeking to have arbitrability
decided by the trial court as a "substantial, bona fide dispute as to arbitrability.62

52. Lutz, 551 A.2d at 398.
53. Id.
54. 552 A.2d 763 (Pa. Conumw. CL 1989), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 828 (Pa. 1989).
55. Middle Bucks, 552 A.2d at 765.
56. 624 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
57. Phoenxville Area Sch. Dist., 624 A.2d at 1087.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 631 A.2d 723 (Pa. Commw. CL 1993). Subsequent references in the text to this case will be
to Chester Upland I.
62. Chester UplandI, 631 A.2d at 727. The court clearly allowed for preliminary determination
of arbitrability by a trial court where an agreement expressly provides that the dispute is not susceptible
to arbitration. Id.
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The court noted that a party could challenge the arbitrability of the dispute on
appeal as a threshold for the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make an award if the
question had been raised before the arbitrator. 63 The court further observed that
the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to determine if the employer's failure to
arbitrate is an unfair labor practice.'
In summarizing the law since the commonwealth court's ruling in Lutz,
the Chester UplandII decision made it clear that up to that moment a trial court
had retained the jurisdictional power to determine arbitrability in the first instance
in some disputes, such as where a party sought to stay arbitration and the
collective bargaining agreement clearly precluded arbitration of the dispute. On
appeal in Chester Upland 11, the Association and the PLRB asked the
commonwealth court to reconsider this grant to trial courts of permissive
jurisdiction over arbitrability.65

IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
After reviewing the procedural history of the appeal, the court in Chester
Upland HI framed the crucial question as being whether PERA section 903
withdrew jurisdiction in the first instance over the arbitrability of labor disputes
from trial courts, jurisdiction seemingly provided for by section 7302(b) of the
UAA as adopted by Pennsylvania.'4 In order to decide which statute controlled,
the court looked to the history of both statutes as well as the case law interpreting
both statutes. 67
The court noted that PERA was enactedin 1970 to resolve public sector labor
disputes in order to create "a harmonious and fair working relationship" for the
benefit of public employees and the public at large. The court further observed
that by enacting PERA section 903 the legislature intended that binding arbitration
of all disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements be mandatory.6"
The court relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Bald

63. Id. The court did not mean that arbitrability could be appealed only if the question had been
raised first before the arbitrator. The court stated that, regardless of whether there was a failure to file
exceptions to arbitrability, that failure to arbitrate was an unfair labor practice and the District could
seek relief if it genuinely disputed arbitrability. Id. at 725.
64. Id. at 727.
65. Chester Upland , 655 A.2d at 628.
66. Id. at 625. The question as stated by the court presumed a conflict between PERA and the
UAA.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 625-26.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1996/iss1/14

8

dy: Kennedy: Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to Determine Arbitrability of Labor Disputes under Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agree
An Arbitrator'sJurisdictionOver Labor Disputes
19961
Eagle9 for the proposition that PERA section 903 requires arbitrators to first

decide all matters relating to collective bargaining agreements. 70 The court
emphasized the Bald Eagle court's disapproval of forum shopping in the form of
litigants going to trial court for a preliminary determination of the arbitrator's

jurisdiction under the collective bargaining agreement."'
Turning next to the UAA, the court observed that under both the UAA and
the Model Act that preceded it, trial courts had the jurisdiction to compel or stay
arbitration, depending on whether or not there was an agreement to arbitrate any
The court then quoted UAA section 501(a) 73 as proof that
grievances."
Pennsylvania statutory law limited the trial court's jurisdiction to determine
arbitrability where such jurisdiction would be inconsistent with "any statute
regulating labor and management relations."74 The court thus reasoned that a
trial court would only have jurisdiction over arbitrability in the first instance if the
UAA were consistent with PERA.75
The commonwealth court next reviewed its case law interpreting the effect
of the UAA on the arbitrability of disputes under collectivebargaining agreements
regulated by state labor statutes. Beginning with its 1988 decision in Lutz, 6 the
court observed that it held, without citing PERA, that the trial court had
jurisdiction where the collective bargaining agreement expressly prohibited
arbitration of the dispute.77 The court then explained that not until the next year
did it consider the relationship between the UAA and PERA, holding in Middle
Bucks78 that the trial court had jurisdiction in the first instance to decide
arbitrability, since PERA was supposedly silent on the issue.79
Explaining how the court's 1993 decision in Phoenixville ° limited a trial
court's jurisdiction to decide arbitrability in the first instance to cases where the
collective bargaining agreement clearly permitted or prohibited arbitration,"' the
court further explained that its reasoning had been based on the premise that
PERA only commanded arbitration where the collective bargaining agreement
could be interpreted as providing for arbitration of the dispute: where the language

69. 451 AX2d 671 (Pa. 1982).
70. Chester Upland I, 655 A.2d at 626 (citing Bald Eagle, 451 A.2d at 674).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 626-27.
73. 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b) (1990).
74. Chester UplandII, 655 A.2d at 627 (quoting 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b) (1990)).
75, Id.
76, 551 A.2d 396 (Pa. Conmw. Ct. 1988).
77. Chester UplandII, 655 A.2d at 627 (citing Mifflin County Sch. Dist v. Lutz, 551 A.2d 396
(Pa. Commw. Ct 1988)).
78. 552 A.2d 763 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
79. Chester Upland II, 655 A.2d at 627.
80. 624 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Comxnw. CL 1993).
81. Chester Upland I, 655 A.2d at 627 (citing Phoenixville, 624 A.2d at 1087).
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of the agreement is so clear as to preclude such an interpretation, the court may
stay arbitration.82
Quoting at length from Chester UplandI,'the court concluded that up until
the present appeal Pennsylvania law had allowed a trial court to enjoin arbitration
in some circumstances. The court also reasoned that where no injunction has been
issued the arbitrator has jurisdiction over arbitrability, and that failure to arbitrate
by either party could be grounds for filing an unfair labor practice charge before
the PLRB.8
On the request of the Association and the PLRB, the commonwealth court
agreed to reconsider its previous rulings concerning the trial court's jurisdiction
to "preemptively" enjoin arbitration under the UAA."5 Reasoning that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's construction of PERA section 903 in Bald Eagle
required all disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements to be decided
in the first instance by an arbitrator, the court concluded that the trial court could
have no concurrent jurisdiction to decide arbitrability, since under the language of
UAA section 501(a) that would not be "consistent" with Pennsylvania labor
statutes.' The court therefore held that UAA section 501(a) by its own terms
does not give the trial court jurisdiction to decide arbitrability in the first instance,
and that under Pennsylvania statute the arbitrator has "sole jurisdiction in the first
instance to decide whether an issue is arbitrable."87 All cases holding to the
contrary were expressly and specifically overruled.'
B. Judge Doyle's Concurrence
Writing separately, Judge Doyle concurred in the result but dissented from
the court's holding that an arbitrator possesses "sole and exclusive"jurisdiction to
adjudicate arbitrability in the first instance.8 9 To the extent the UAA was
inconsistent with PERA, Judge Doyle argued that the court had already reconciled
the two statutes in its prior decisions.9
Looking at the statutory history, Judge Doyle argued that the legislature's
enactment of the present version of the UAA in 1980, ten years after the
enactment of PERA, could not have been intended to divest trial courts of
concurrent jurisdiction to decide arbitrability in the first instance. 91 Judge Doyle

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. (quoting Phoenixville, 624 A.2d at 1087).
631 A.2d 723, 727 (Pa. Commw. C. 1993).
Chester Upland 11, 655 A.2d at 628.
Id.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 629.
Id. n.19.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id. at 632.
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charged that the court misstated the import of PERA section 903 by characterizing
it as commanding arbitration of all disputes arising out of collective bargaining
agreements: the dispute has to arise out of the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement to be arbitrable.9 The applicability of the collective
bargaining agreement in the first place, Judge Doyle stated, was a separate
issue.93 By divesting the courts of the power to decide arbitrability in the first
instance, the court's decision would interfere with the "prompt disposition of the
substantive dispute."94
Criticizing the majority's characterization of the relevant case law, Judge
Doyle took issue with the court's interpretation of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's ruling in Bald Eagle.95 The concurrence faulted the majority for
emphasizing the Bald Eagle court's solicitude of arbitration at the expense of that
court's concern with the swift disposition of disputes.96 Since the petition in
Bald Eagle came from an appeal to the courts from a decision of the PLRB that
failure to arbitrate was an unfair labor practice, Judge Doyle reasoned that nothing
in Bald Eagle should be read to apply to cases where no charge had yet been filed
before the PLRB.97 Until an unfair labor practices charge has been filed with the
PLRB, Judge Doyle argued that trial courts still have concurrent jurisdiction to
decide arbitrability where an equity action has been duly filed under UAA section
5019 Judge Doyle advanced the idea that drawing the jurisdictional boundary
line at the point where a charge has been filed with the PLRB or an injunction is
sought from a trial court would resolve the uncertainty remaining after Chester
Upland I as to when arbitrability could be decided by a trial court. 99 Thus, Judge
Doyle reasoned that there was not necessarily an inconsistency between PERA and
the UAA.
Responding to the majority's concern that the alternative to giving the
arbitrator sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine arbitrability in the first
instance would be to encourage forum shopping, Judge Doyle pointed out that any
application for a stay of arbitration filed in a court subsequent to filing of a charge
°
with the PLRB would be quashed upon application of the other party."
Observing that the courts would have to consider arbitrability either in the first
instance or on appeal, Judge Doyle maintained that swift initial determination of

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 632-33.
95. Id. at 633-34.
9& Id. at 633.
97. Id. at 633-34.
98. Id. at 634.
99. Id. at 635.
100. This argument flows directly from his previous statement that the PLRB assumes exclusive
jurisdiction over arbitrability once an unfair labor practices change has been filed with the PLRB.
Presumably there would then be no greater need to rush to the courthouse than to run to the PLRB.
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the threshold issue of arbitrability was a compelling public policy supporting
concurrent jurisdiction prior to filing with the PLRB.' 0 ' Turning back to the
case at hand, Judge Doyle concurred in the result since the unfair labor practices
charge had been filed with the PLRB prior to the District's application for an
injunction against arbitration proceedings.'02

V.

COMMENT

A. Immediate Effect of Granting Arbitrator Sole and Exclusive
Jurisdiction to Decide Arbitrability on Forum Shopping
Depriving courts of any preliminary jurisdiction over the arbitrability of labor
disputes under public collectivebargaining agreements, as the commonwealth court
did in Chester Upland 11,103 would have the immediate consequence of
preventing the arbitration-averse party from litigating the arbitrator's jurisdiction
before a judicial forum. Non-arbitrability is no longer to be an appropriate
grounds for seeking a stay of arbitration or opposing the enjoining of arbitration.
Judicial determination of an arbitrator's jurisdiction prior to an arbitration award
has been seemingly foreclosed by the appellate court's decision in Chester Upland
II. This is in marked contrast to the jurisdictional scheme not considered by the
majority but endorsed by Judge Doyle in his concurring opinion. On Judge
Doyle's interpretation of the prior case law, a court would have the jurisdiction to
rule upon the aibitrability of the labor dispute up until the point where the party
seeking arbitration files an unfair labor practices charge before the PLRB against
the party opposing arbitration for not complying with arbitration procedures."°
Assuming that Judge Doyle's statement of the prior law is correct, the opportunity
for prior judicial determination of arbitrability under the concurrent jurisdictional
scheme was rather less than that suggested by the critics of prior judicial action.
But while the opportunities for judicial action may have been less, the
incentives for seeking judicial action in advance of arbitration may have been very
great. Responding to criticisms of prior judicial intervention in determining
arbitrability, Judge Doyle dismisses the "race to the courthouse."' ' However,
Judge Doyle overlooks that if the judiciary retains preliminary jurisdiction over
arbitrability prior to any filing with the PLRB, the party wishing to oppose
arbitration (usually the employer) would have an incentive to go to court as soon

101.
102.
103.
an issue
104.
105.

Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 629. The arbitrator now "has sole jurisdiction in the first instance to decide whether
is arbitrable." Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.
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as possible to stay arbitration before the filing of an unfair labor practices charge.
The simple reason is that the party seeking arbitration (usually the employee)
cannot file an unfair labor charge with the PLRB before the opposing party has
refused to proceed to arbitration,"'° whereas the opposing party has an advantage
in the form of an asymmetrical power of seeking to stay arbitration as soon as
labor arbitration is requested. Therefore the party wanting to oppose arbitration
on the grounds of non-arbitrability would have an incentive to seek judicial
determination of arbitrability as soon as arbitration is first requested, lest the
advantage of choosing a judicial forum be lost. Thus, the race to the courthouse
would no longer be a race so much as a reflex response by those parties resisting
arbitration. The obvious and now unavoidable question is whether prior judicial
declarations as to the arbitrability of public labor disputes under collective
bargaining agreements are something the commonwealth court in Chester Upland
II was right in wanting to curb.
B. Effect of the Ruling on the Swift, Consistent, and Conclusive
Disposition of Public Labor Disputes under Collective Bargaining
Agreements
Given that the commonwealth court's ruling in Chester Upland II clearly
changed prior Pennsylvania law by depriving trial courts of jurisdiction over
preliminary questions of arbitrability,"' 7 the crucial question is whether this new
approach is generally preferable to the previous scheme of concurrent jurisdiction.
The comparative merits of this change in the law will be analyzed first in terms
of the rapid and conclusive resolution of public labor disputes.' 8
Assuming that the prior rule allowing trial courts to exercise preliminary
jurisdiction over arbitrability in unambiguous cases did encourage parties to race
to court, an argument can be made in favor of this policy on the basis that it
encouraged swift and more conclusive resolution of the threshold issue of

106. It is the refusal to arbitrate that constitutes an unfair labor practice. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1101.1201 (1990); East Pennsboro Area Sch. Dist v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 467 A.2d
1356, 1359 (Pa. Conmw. CL 1983); Chester Upland1, 631 A.2d at 727. Unless a party has been
informed that the other party desires arbitration, the party cannot be said to have refused to arbitrate.
In Chester Upland I, the refusal was communicated in response to a grievance filing, Id at 724, and
in Chester Upland II, the refusal camte in the form of a failure to respond to repeated entreaties for

arbitration, 655 A.2d at 623.
107. Chester Upland II, 655 A.2d at 629 n.19.
108. This consideration was clearly a concern of the Bald Eagle court, which Judge Doyle in
concurrence emphasizes as being the fundamental policy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling.
The dispute in Bald Eagle concerned a single day's pay and it took six years to resolve the question
of arbitrability. Id. at 633 (citing BaldEagle, 451 A.2d at 673).
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arbitrability." To the extent Judge Doyle's variation of this scheme would give
the arbitration-averse party an urgent incentive to proceed immediately to court,
Judge Doyle's alternative would be preferable from the standpoint of efficiency
to the majority's per se jurisdictional rule. There is some truth to Judge Doyle's
assertion that the courts will almost certainly have to decide the issue of
arbitrability eventually," 0 so it is better to have a judge sitting in equity decide
the issue sooner rather than later, thereby speeding final adjudication."'
Otherwise, the argument continues, time and resources may be expended on full
arbitration of all issues when only one issue, that of arbitrability, demands
resolution.
Proponents of the arbitrator's sole and exclusive initial jurisdiction over
arbitrability would rightly point out that the argument above assumes that
arbitrability will usually have to be decided by a court at some point later in the
process." 2 The response is that arbitrability will only be a legitimate source of
dispute in a select few cases, and that it is thus more efficient to have the
arbitrator decide arbitrability along with other matters in dispute, leaving it to the
judiciary to reverse the arbitrator on arbitrability in the few cases where
arbitrability is legitimately in dispute and where the party opposing arbitration
should prevail." 3
This response to the argument for concurrent jurisdiction overlooks an
important point of the efficiency argument in support of preliminary concurrent
jurisdiction: the fact that arbitrability may only be legitimately in dispute in a
minority of cases does not mean that arbitrability will not be argued in many more
cases." 4 It is the number rather than the quality of arbitrability challenges that
threatens inefficiency when they must be processed through a system where the
arbitrator has sole and exclusive initial jurisdiction over arbitrability. Merely
assuming that the party opposing arbitration simply wishes to cover all bases on
a petition for review of an arbitration award or of a PLRB determination, or
assuming that the party opposing arbitration thinks that even a feeble arbitrability

109. Indeed, Judge Doyle himself places reliance on this argument in defending a trial court's
ability to determine arbitrability before the arbitrator makes his determination. "Moreover, the
compelling public policy behind this procedure is the swift determination of the threshold issue of
whether the controversy/grievance should even be before an arbitrator." Id. at 635.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. "Ultimately it will be the courts which will determine that issue [arbitrability under a
collective bargaining agreement], either in the first instance or on appeal." Id. (Doyle, J.,
dissenting)(emphasis in the original).
113. Craver, supra note 6, at 584.
114. That an argument lacks merit does not mean that a party will forebear making it. Aside from
being a general empirical truth, this is especially the case here given the reluctance of public employers
to submit to arbitration if they can plausibly avoid it, a reluctance more than amply demonstrated by
the multitude of cases in which public employers have disputed arbitrability and the few cases in which
they have succeeded. See infra note 115.
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challenge stands a respectable chance of success before a judge," 5 then one sees

that the courts will ultimately have to decide arbitrability on subsequent review
almost as a matter of routine. In that event, all Chester Upland I1 succeeds in
accomplishing is the adding of another level to the ultimate resolution of the
threshold issue of arbitrability of proceedings. To the extent that the arbitrability
challenges are legitimate, the resolution of arbitrability questions will demand
more resources at the levels of both arbitration and judicial review.

By contrast, denying jurisdiction over arbitrabilityto circuit courts altogether,
the approach adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Warren," 6 streamlines
the dispute-resolution process by going in the opposite direction from Judge

Doyle." 7 Instead of emphasizing the role of circuit courts over arbitrators in
determining arbitrability, the Illinois scheme removes the circuit courts from the
decision-making process completely and allows direct appeal to the intermediate

appellate court. As a practical matter, the majority in Chester Upland I simply
forces both the arbitrator and the trial court to rule on the same matter before it

is ready for appellate review. Three decision-makers (arbitrator, trial court,
appellate court) will have to rule upon what two (trial court and appellate court)
could decide if the traditional sequence were followed. In addition, the arbitrator

will waste time deciding other issues in the event that the dispute was not actually
arbitrable in the first place.

Removing concurrent jurisdiction over pre-arbitration questions of
arbitrability from trial courts has also been commended on the grounds that it
removes a double threat of inconsistency in the resolution of arbitrability matters.
First, some have argued that such jurisdiction creates the certainty that different
trial courts will make inconsistent rulings in the same dispute." 8 For example,
one trial court may refuse to stay arbitration on the grounds of arbitrability, while

115. Why is arbitrability so often challenged by public employers in court? "The reluctance of
various public employers to submit disputes to arbitration evidently centers on the limited scope of
judicial review from an arbitrator's decision." East Pennsboro Area Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. & E. Pennsboro Area Educ. Ass'n., 467 A.2d 1356,
1359-60 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). Apparently, public employers feel that once arbitration begins an
arbitrator is not likely to find the grievance non-arbitrable, and a court on review will, after the
Trilogy, be reluctant to set aside the arbitration award except in extreme cases.
116. 538 N.E.2d 524 (IlL. 1989).
117. The administrative agency created by the Act, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board,
makes a determination of arbitrability that can be challenged on appeal of an award to the Illinois
Court of Appeals. Id. at 529 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, par. 1716 (1987)). Admittedly, the Illinois
alternative was clearly not available to the commonwealth court in Chester Upland II, since the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act was, according to the Illinois Supreme Court, a sweeping and radical
reform of labor relations in public education. Id. at 529. Redefinition of justiciability to exclude
public education labor disputes was thus implied by the Illinois Supreme Court from the legislature's
radical departure from common law and the inferred need to "prevent conflict between the circuit
courts and the Board." Id.
118. See, e.g., Widoff & Fastiggi, supra note 5, at 655.
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another trial court later may find that the same dispute was not arbitrable and
vacate the arbitrator's award. Second, some commentators. 9 and appellate
courts 2 ° (including the court in Chester Upland 11)' see cause for concern
in the potential inconsistency between decisions of trial courts on arbitrability and
the decisions of public labor relations commissions, such as the PLRB, on whether
failure to arbitrate in the same case constitutes an unfair labor practice.
The best answer to both prongs of the inconsistency argument is that the
threat of inconsistency from concurrent jurisdiction is largely chimerical.l"
Given the extremely limited circumstances in which any decision-maker will find
it is extremely unlikely that different
that the dispute is truly non-arbitrable,'
trial courts in the same case' or a trial court and a public labor board looking
at the same collective bargaining agreement will find that the agreement clearly
prohibits arbitration of the labor dispute. Even assuming that a labor board such
as the PLRB finds a failure to arbitrate to be an unfair labor practice while either
an earlier trial court finds the dispute non-arbitrable and stays arbitration or a later
trial court vacates an award for non-arbitrability, the board's finding of an unfair
labor practice itself will be reviewed by a subsequent trial court which will then
be able to resolve the conflict by determining the arbitrability of the dispute.
Conflict is even less likely under Judge Doyle's reading of the prior law, which
gives the PLRB the exclusive jurisdiction over initial questions of arbitrability
once failure to arbitrate has been alleged as an unfair labor practice before the
PLRB.' 25 That determination by the PLRB is itself reviewable by a circuit
court, which suggests another answer to the inconsistency argument: where the
courts and public labor relations agencies are in conflict, the conflict exists only
until the judiciary exercises its supremacy over administrative agencies in the
determination of arbitrability.

119. See, e.g., id. at 653-56.
120. See, e.g., Warren Township, 538 N.E.2d at 529; Bald Eagle, 451 A.2d at 674.
121. Chester UplandfI, 655 A.2d at 626.
122. Widoff & Fastiggi, supranote 5, at 655, admit that such a case has not yet arisen but couch
their argument in terms of inevitability.
123. Doubts as a general rule are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability, Taylor v. Crane, 595
P.2d 129, 134 (Cal. 1979), and there has to be a bona fide dispute as to arbitrability under § 501(a)
of the UAA, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(b) (1990), such that the dispute cannot be arbitrable
under any asserted construction of the collective bargaining agreement Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist.
of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Fed'n. of Teachers, Local No. 3, 346 A.2d 35, 41 n.13 (Pa. 1975).
124. It is assumed that the doctrine of res judicata does not prevent two different circuit courts
in the same case from issuing contradictory rulings regarding arbitrability.
125. 655 A.2d at 634.
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C. Effect of Grant to Arbitratorof Sole and Exclusive Jurisdictionto
Decide Arbitrabilityon Harmonious Relations between Public
Employers and Employees
Courts and commentators have attackedpreliminary litigation of arbitrability
on the basis that judicial intervention frustrates the arbitration process and thus
interferes with the harmonious resolution of public labor disputes.'2 6 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that PERA was intended to provide for the
effective resolution of public labor disputes without disruption through strikes and
other forms of economic pressure, requiring instead that all disputes relating to
collective bargaining agreements be arbitrated. 7
Whether this criticism is accurate or not is less important than the
presuppositions of the criticism itself and the scope. First, the argument focuses
on the process of the arbitration itself without considering its essential propriety
in any given dispute. The legislature does not require arbitration of all public
labor disputes, only those disputes that are to be arbitrated under the terms of an
underlying collective bargaining agreement. Whether a labor dispute is arbitrable
under a collective bargaining agreement is precisely the question to be answered
in a determination of arbitrability, whether that determination is prior to or after
an award. If the dispute is actually non-arbitrable, and a trial court on a motion
for stay of arbitration could swiftly find so, then maybe it is less disruptive not to
have arbitration in such a case. Second, and more important, the criticism focuses
on the process of arbitration alone without considering the result of the arbitration
process. Under the court's approach in Chester UplandII, public employers can
and will continue to challenge arbitrability before trial courts, but only after the
Arbitrability will
arbitrator has given an award to the employee or union.'
have gone from being an early objection to the propriety of the process itself to
being seen as a last ditch argument made by public employers to challenge
successful aggrieved employees or unions on motios to vacate arbitration awards
or review findings of an unfair labor practice. Whether this change in the
dominant use of judicial intervention on matters of arbitrability is preferable in
terms of harmonious public labor relations is unclear to say the least.

126. See East Pennsboro, 467 A.2d at 1361; Craver supra note 6, at 584.
127. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 346 A.2d at 39.
128. In considering the rule finding a waiver of arbitrability challenges where a party has
proceeded to arbitration, Hodges mentions this argument as one disadvantage of the alternative policy
of allowing the party who submits to arbitration to later challenge arbitrability. Hodges, supra note
2, at 643 n.71.
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VI. CONCLUSION

By removing any jurisdiction overpre-arbitration questions of the arbitrability
of public labor disputes from Pennsylvania trial courts, the Chester Upland II
court sought to discourage the problem of preliminary forum-shopping between
courts and arbilrators. However, the new rule, conferring on arbitrators sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over preliminary matters of arbitrability, risks delaying the
ultimate resolution of disputes if parties to public collective bargaining agreements
regularly continue to challenge the arbitrability of labor disputes. By essentially
mandating the involvement of arbitrators in the determination of arbitrability while
still allowing appeals of awards to trial courts, the Chester Upland II court gave
public labor relations in Pennsylvania the worst of both worlds.
BRIAN
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